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 1 
THE CASE FOR CONSIDERING A CHILD’S OPINION IN DETERMINING 
HABITUAL RESIDENCE IN HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF 
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION CASES 
 
Samantha Rumsey* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 Imagine you are a twelve-year-old child with both U.S. and Argentine citizenship.  Your 
whole family lived in Argentina together until your parents divorced four years ago.  Then, your 
father moved to the United States, while you stayed in Argentina with your mother.  Two years 
ago, your mother agreed to let you live with your father for an open-ended period of time.  She 
thought it would be good for you to spend time with your father and to improve your English.  
Now, your mother wants you to return to Argentina, but your father will not let you go.  In a few 
months, a U.S. court will decide whether your father is wrong for keeping you in the United 
States.  The outcome of these proceedings will depend heavily upon a determination of your 
“country of habitual residence.”  You firmly believe that Argentina is your home, and while you 
have enjoyed your time in the United States, you are looking forward to returning to your school, 
friends and family in Argentina.  You are confused and upset when you learn that you will not be 
appointed your own lawyer and that the court will not take your opinion into account when 
making this important decision.
1
 
Many children in the United States are in this frustrating and painful situation.
2
  In 2012, 
parents in the United States opened more than 900 cases alleging international child abduction, 
representing over 1,000 abducted or wrongfully-retained children.
3
  In deciding a child’s 
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1
 This is a hypothetical, illustrative example.  
2
 See New Outgoing Cases—CY 2012, DEPARTMENT OF STATE (Nov. 24, 2013, 8:37 PM), 
http://travel.state.gov/abduction/resources/resources_3860.html. 
3
 Id.  
 2 
“country of habitual residence,” which is often a key issue in international child abduction cases, 
U.S. courts do not use a standard that directly takes a child’s opinion into account.4  Moreover, in 
many circumstances, the courts that adjudicate these cases do not provide children with 
independent representation.
5
  As a result, courts silence children in proceedings that profoundly 
impact their lives.  
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“Hague 
Convention”), which governs international child abductions in both the United States and other 
signatory countries, creates a procedure for the prompt return of internationally abducted 
children.
6
  The stated objectives of the Hague Convention are: first, “to secure the prompt return 
of children wrongfully removed or retained in any Contracting State”; and second, “to ensure 
that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively 
respected in other Contracting States.”7  The Hague Convention also sets out the circumstances 
under which the removal or retention of a child is considered wrongful:  
(1) Where the removal or retention is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a 
person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of 
the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the 
removal or retention; and (2) At the time of removal or retention those rights were 
actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for 
the removal or retention.
8
   
  
                                                        
4
 Several circuits take a child’s level of acclimatization to or past experiences in a country into account when 
determining country of habitual residence; none of these circuits, however, specifically designate as a factor a 
child’s testimony as to what country they feel should be that in which they are habitually resident.  See, e.g., 
Barzilay v. Barzilay, 600 F.3d 912, 918 (8th Cir. 2010); Karkkainen v. Kovalchuk, 445 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2006); 
Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1401 (6th Cir. 1993).  
5
 See Merle H. Wiener, Intolerable Situations and Counsel for Children: Following Switzerland’s Example in Hague 
Child Abduction Cases, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 355, 377 (2008).  
6
 See generally Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction of 1980, Oct. 25, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 
1501 (1980) [hereinafter Convention].  The International Child Abduction Remedies Act implements the 
Convention within the United States.  42 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1610 (2008). 
7
 Convention, supra note 6, at art. 1.  
8
 Id. at art. 3 (emphasis added). 
 3 
Under this framework, determining a child’s state of habitual residence is absolutely 
essential to analysis under the Hague Convention because the child’s country of habitual 
residence supplies the domestic law that determines whether a child’s removal violated a 
parent’s rights.9  Yet, despite the importance of country of habitual residence determinations, the 
text of the Convention does not define this term.
10
  The Convention drafters deliberately chose 
not to define the term in order to “leave the notion free from technical rules which can produce 
rigidity and inconsistencies.”11 
 Early decisions outside the United States sought to obey the drafters’ wishes and avoid 
overcomplicating the issue of habitual residence with layers of inflexible doctrine.
12
  An English 
opinion widely cited in American courts expressed this aspiration: 
It is greatly to be hoped that the courts will resist the temptation to develop 
detailed and restrictive rules as to habitual residence, which might make it as 
technical a term of art as common law domicile.  The facts and circumstances of 
each case should continue to be assessed without resort to presumptions or pre-
suppositions.
13
  
 
 In U.S. courts, however, this hope quickly evaporated.  For more than twenty years, U.S. 
circuit courts of appeals have disagreed over how “habitual residence” should be defined.  
Specifically, courts have differed as to whether more weight should be given to the child’s 
experience and level of acclimatization or to the parents’ “settled purpose” to live with a child in 
a given place.
14
  Even those courts that more heavily emphasize the child’s experience in their 
                                                        
9
 Id.  
10
 Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 1995). 
11
 Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing J.H.C. MORRIS, DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE 
CONFLICT OF LAWS 144 (10th ed. 1980)).  
12
 Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F.3d 729, 742 (7th Cir. 2013) (discussing the Convention’s failure to define the term 
habitual residence and discussing foreign courts’ early decisions interpreting the term).  
13
 Id. (citing Re Bates (1989), No. CA 122/89 (High Ct. of Justice, Fam. Div., Eng), 1989 WL 1683783.  
14
 Compare, e.g., Feder, 63 F.3d at 224 (“[A] child’s habitual residence is the place where he or she has been 
physically present for an amount of time sufficient for acclimatization and which has a ‘degree of settled purpose’ 
from the child’s perspective.”), and Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1401 (“To determine the habitual residence, the court 
must focus on the child, not the parents, and examine past experience, not future intentions.”), with Mozes, 239 F.3d 
 4 
analysis do not directly take the child’s opinion into account as a factor for deciding country of 
habitual residence.
15
 
 This Comment argues that U.S. courts should consider a child’s opinion when deciding 
his or her country of habitual residence in Hague Convention cases.
16
  This Comment further 
contends that courts should appoint counsel for children in all Hague Convention cases because 
mandatory representation is the best way to give children a strong voice in habitual residence 
determinations.  Simply put, considering children’s views and giving them dedicated attorneys to 
advocate for these beliefs would result in more accurate and child-friendly determinations of 
country of habitual residence.  Finally, this Comment presents a model standard for determining 
country of habitual residence and looks to other countries’ approaches to providing children with 
representation.  
 Part II of this Comment outlines the two main approaches to determining country of 
habitual residence that have been adopted by U.S. courts.  Part III sets out the alternate tests used 
in both common law and civil law foreign jurisdictions.   Part IV discusses the U.S. trend against 
appointing counsel to represent children in Hague Convention cases.  Part V presents arguments 
in support of the creation of a child-centric system for determining country of habitual residence 
and offers U.S. courts a model standard for determining country of habitual residence.  Part VI 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
at 1076 (“[T]he intention or purpose which has to be taken into account is that of the person or persons entitled to fix 
the place of the child’s residence.”).  
15
 See Eran Sthoeger, International Child Abduction and Children’s Rights: Two Means to the Same End, 32 MICH. 
J. INT’L L. 511, 529 (2011) (“As for the methods of obtaining the child's views, courts tend to do so through a 
welfare officer or psychologist working on behalf of the court, or through the parents.”). 
16
 It is important to note that children have the best chance of voicing their opinion in Hague Convention cases by 
utilizing the “child’s objection” exception to the Convention’s mandatory return requirement.  This gives a judicial 
authority the option to “refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and 
has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.”  See Convention 
supra note 6, at art. 13.  This exception, however, was intended by the Convention drafters to be used sparingly.  See 
Christina Piemonte, Comment, International Child Abduction and Courts’ Evolving Considerations in Evaluating 
the Hague Convention’s Defenses to Return, 22 TUL. J. INT’L COMP. L. 191, 194 (2013) (citing Convention, supra 
note 6, at arts. 1, 2, 12, 13, 20).  The intention that this exception be used in a limited fashion supports this 
Comment’s proposition that a child’s opinion should be taken into account specifically with respect to country of 
habitual residence determinations. See discussion infra Section V.C.  
 5 
describes how other Hague Convention signatory countries have implemented the requirement of 
appointed counsel and argues that the appointment of independent counsel for the child in every 
U.S. Hague Convention case would lead to more child-friendly determinations of country of 
habitual residence. Part VII concludes this Comment.   
II.  U.S. Courts’ Tests For Determining Country Of Habitual Residence 
U.S. circuit courts fall roughly into two camps with respect to their approaches to 
deciding a child’s country of habitual residence.  The first group emphasizes the child’s 
perspective and gives secondary consideration to parents’ intentions.  The second set focuses on 
parental intent and only gives consideration to the child’s perspective in extraordinary cases. 
A. Emphasis on the Child’s Perspective 
The Third, Sixth and Eighth Circuits have each held that a determination of country of 
habitual residence should focus on the child’s perspective, though they have differed in how 
much weight they give to parents’ intentions as an additional factor for consideration.  All three 
circuits fail to directly consider a child of reasonable age and maturity’s opinion as to what is his 
or her country of habitual of residence.  
The Sixth Circuit in Friedrich v. Friedrich was the first federal appellate court to 
approach the question of which country is a child’s habitual residence by focusing on the 
perspective of the child.
17
  In this case, a German man and an American woman stationed for 
military service in Germany married and had a child.
18
  After about a year and a half, a marital 
dispute resulted in the mother taking the child to the United States without the father’s consent or 
knowledge.
19
  The German father filed a petition in the United States alleging that his son’s 
                                                        
17
 Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1396. 
18
 Id. at 1398. 
19
 Id. at 1399. 
 6 
removal from Germany was wrongful.
20
  The court first emphasized that a habitual residence 
inquiry must “focus on the child, not the parents, and examine past experience, not future 
intentions.”21  The court also explicitly noted that changes in parental affection and responsibility 
could not alter habitual residence.
22
  In this case, the court did not attempt to elicit the child’s 
opinion about whether Germany or the United States was his country of habitual residence; the 
court likely did not consider the child’s views, however, because he was very young at the time 
of the wrongful retention.
23
 
In Feder v. Evans-Feder, the Third Circuit joined the Sixth Circuit and held that country 
of habitual residence determinations should focus on the child’s perspective. 24   The court, 
however, qualified this holding by stating that while the standard must “focus on the child,” it 
must also consider “the parents’ present, shared intentions regarding their child’s presence 
there.”25  As in Friedrich, the possibility of taking an affected child’s opinion into account was 
not considered; this failure, however, potentially related to the fact that the child at issue was 
only four years old at the time of unlawful removal.
26
   
In Karkkainen v. Kovalchuk, another Hague Convention case, the Third Circuit 
confronted a very different set of facts.
27
  Maria Kovalchuk was born in Russia to married 
parents, who divorced when she was five years old.
28
  After their divorce, Maria’s father moved 
                                                        
20
 Id.  
21
 Id. at 1401. 
22
 Id. at 1402 (“[H]abitual residence can be “altered” only by a change in geography and the passage of time, not by 
changes in parental affection and responsibility.”). 
23
 Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1398.  
24
 Feder, 63 F.3d at 224 (“A child’s habitual residence is the place where he or she has been physically present for 
an amount of time sufficient for acclimatization and which has a “degree of settled purpose” from the child’s 
perspective.”). 
25
 Id.  
26
 Id.  
27
 Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 285–87. 
28
 Id. at 285. 
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to the United States and her mother moved to Finland.
29
  Maria’s parents agreed that she would 
live with her mother in Finland, and Maria lived there until she was eleven years old.
30
  At 
eleven, after acquiring U.S. Permanent Resident Status, Maria expressed a desire to move to the 
United States permanently.
31
  She said goodbye to her teacher and friends, and as soon as the 
Finnish school year ended, she went to the United States to live with her father with her mother’s 
permission.
32
  At the end of the summer, Maria desired to stay in the United States, and over her 
mother’s objections, Maria’s father did not send her back to Finland.33  Subsequently, litigation 
ensued.
34
  In determining Maria’s country of habitual residence, the Third Circuit clarified its 
holding in Feder and held that that in making a country of habitual residence determination a 
trier of fact should focus on: (1) “acclimatization and settled purpose ‘from the child’s 
perspective’”; and (2) parental intent, both with respect to how it affects a child’s perspective 
and by giving “independent weight to ‘the parents’ present shared intentions regarding their 
child’s presence’ in a particular place.”35  
The Karkkainen court was also unique in that it explicitly stated that shared parental 
intent should be given great weight in cases of very young children and less weight in cases of 
older children.
36
  The court, did not decide exactly how much weight shared parental intent 
should be given in cases of older children, such as Maria.
37
  Additionally, even though the court 
                                                        
29
 Id. 
30
 Id.  
31
 Id. at 286. 
32
 Id.  The facts of the case indicate that Maria’s mother gave her explicit permission to live in the United States for 
the summer.  In a later conversation, Maria’s stepfather told her that she was free to make the decision to remain in 
the United States at the end of the summer.  Because her mother did not disagree with this statement, “Maria was 
left with the impression that she had been given permission to move permanently to the United States if she 
wished.”  Id.  
33
 Karkkainen 445 F.3d at 286. 
34
 Id. at 286. 
35
 Id. at 292 (citing Feder, 63 F.3d at 224).  
36
 Id. at 296.  
37
 Id.  
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repeatedly stated that Maria was mature and intelligent,
38
 the court did not directly consider 
Maria’s opinion about her country of habitual residence.39 
In Barzilay v. Barzilay, a case in which an Israeli citizen alleged his former wife 
wrongfully retained his children in the United States, the Eighth Circuit adopted the rationale of 
Feder.
40
  The court held that, “the ‘settled purpose’ of a family’s move to a new country is the 
central element of the habitual residence inquiry” and that this purpose “must be from the child’s 
perspective.”41  The court further emphasized that the determination should be “particularly 
sensitive to the perspective and circumstances of the child.”42  Despite the court’s decision to 
focus on the child’s perspective, it did not consider the opinion of the eldest child affected by the 
proceedings, who was twelve years old at the time the alleged wrongful retention occurred.
43
  
B. Emphasis on the Parents’ Perspectives 
In contrast, other circuit courts choose to emphasize the parents’ perspectives. The 
seminal case finding that parental intent should determine a child’s habitual residence is the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Mozes v. Mozes.44  Many courts have modeled their approach to 
determining habitual residence after this decision.
45
  In Mozes, the court held that in order to 
determine whether a child acquires a new habitual residence, judges should give the most weight 
                                                        
38
 Id. at 286 (“Maria is both mature and intelligent for her age”); id. at 294 (“Maria is ‘uniquely talented and highly 
intelligent,’ an experienced traveler with strong English skill, and mature for her age.”). 
39
 In a subsequent case related to the wrongful retention of a five-year-old child, Tsai-Yi Yang v. Fu-Chiang Tsui, 
although the court did not consider the child’s opinion they did seem to indicate that this would be appropriate in the 
cases of older children stating, “[a]s the record does not reflect Raeann’s perspective on her habitual residence, we 
must focus on the parents’ present, shared intentions.”  416 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2005). 
40
 Barzilay v. Barzilay, 600 F.3d 912, 918 (8th Cir. 2010). 
41
 Id.  
42
 Id. at 920. 
43
 Id. 
44
 Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001).  
45
 See D. MARIANNE BLAIRE ET AL, FAMILY LAW IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 440 (2d ed. 2009) (citing Tsai-Yi Yang 
v. Fu-Chiang Tsui, 416 F.3d 199, 272 (3d Cir. 2005); Koch v. Koch, 450 F.3d 703 (7th Cir. 2006); Gitter v. Gitter, 
396 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2005); Ruiz v. Tenorio, 392 F.3d 127 (11th Cir. 2004); Silverman v. Silverman, 338, F.3d 886 
(8th Cir. 2003); see also Papakosmas v. Papakosmas, 483 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2007) (adopting Mozes’ country of 
habitual residence rule); Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2004) (also adopting Mozes’ country of habitual 
residence rule).   
 9 
to the intentions or purposes of the “person or persons who are entitled to fix the place of the 
child’s residence.”46  The court qualified this rule by stating that the settled intention of the 
parents must be accompanied by “an actual change in geography” and the passage of a sufficient 
length of time for the child to have become acclimatized.
47
 
The court also addressed when, if ever, evidence of acclimatization of a child can suffice 
to establish a child’s habitual residence despite uncertain or conflicting parental intent.48  In 
answering this question, the court held that a child could lose his or her habitual attachment to a 
place without a parent’s consent only in circumstances where “the objective facts point 
unequivocally to a person’s ordinary or habitual residence being a particular place.”49  The court 
further elaborated that this means that a child must show that his or her “relative attachments 
have changed to the point where requiring return to the original forum would now be tantamount 
to taking the child ‘out of the family and social environment in which its life has developed.’”50  
This holding set a high bar for individuals trying to show that a child’s acclimatization can 
overcome parental intent. 
51
  
The Eleventh Circuit adopted a similar definition of “country of habitual residence” in 
Ruiz v. Tenorio.
52
  In this case, an American couple and their two children moved to Mexico 
after seven years living as a family in the United States.
53
  While in Mexico, the father took a 
job, the family began construction on an “American-style” home, and the children attended 
                                                        
46
 Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1077. 
47
 Id. at 1078. 
48
 Id. 
49
 Id. at 1081. 
50
 Id.  
51
 See Tai Vivatvaraphol, Back to Basics: Determining A Child’s Habitual Residence In International Child 
Abduction Cases Under the Hague Convention 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 3325, 3349 (2009); see also Gitter, 396 F.3d 
124, 134 (adopting the Mozes approach and emphasizing that it is only in “relatively rare circumstances” that “a 
child’s acclimatization to a location abroad will be so complete that serious harm can be expected to result from 
compelling his return to his family’s intended residence”). 
52
 Ruiz v. Tenorio, 392 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2004). 
53
 Id. at 1249. 
 10 
school and forged friendships.
54
  After about two years in Mexico, the couple separated; and, a 
few months later, the mother removed the children to the United States.
55
  Applying the Mozes 
definition,
56
 the court held that although the case was “close,” the parents had never formed a 
settled intent to abandon the children’s habitual residence in the United States.57  Moreover, it 
held that the children had not sufficiently acclimated to Mexico to overcome their parents’ lack 
of shared intent.
58
  
In Koch v. Koch the Seventh Circuit also adopted the rule in Mozes, but added a new 
emphasis, arguing that the rule was not rigid and that courts applying it should be “keenly aware 
of the flexible, fact-specific nature of the habitual residence inquiry envisioned by the 
Convention.”59  In this case, Mr. and Mrs. Koch and their two children moved from the United 
States to Germany when one of the children was only eleven days old and the other was a 
toddler.
60
  Both parties agreed that the move was a semi-temporary way both for the family to 
save money and for Mr. Koch to accrue work experience.
61
  After two years in Germany, Mr. 
Koch took the children to the United States without their mother’s knowledge or consent.62  
Several months later, Mr. Koch returned to Germany; but after about five months, he removed 
the children to the United States for the second time.
63
  At the time of the second removal one 
child had lived her whole life
64
 in Germany, and the other had lived three of his five years in 
                                                        
54
 Id. at 1249–51. 
55
 Id. at 1250. 
56
 Id. at 1252. 
57
 Id. at 1256. 
58
 Ruiz, 392 F.3d at 1255. 
59
 Koch v. Koch, 450 F.3d 703, 716 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009, 1015 (9th Cir. 2004)) 
(emphasis added). 
60
 Id. at 706. 
61
 Id.  
62
 Id. at 707. 
63
 Id. at 708. 
64
 Here, “whole life” excludes the period of wrongful removal. 
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Germany.
65
  Based on a flexible inquiry, the court held that the parents had abandoned the 
children’s habitual residence in the United States.66  Moreover, it held that even if the parents 
had not chosen to abandon the United States, the children had become acclimated to Germany to 
an extent that it had become their habitual residence.
67
  This case serves as an example of the 
most weight that can be given to a child’s perspective in a court that follows the Mozes rule. 
C. The Impact of Immigration Status on “Degree of Settled Purpose” 
Although courts generally follow one of the above previous approaches when 
determining a child’s habitual residence, an additional factor that can have an impact on 
determinations of habitual residence is immigration status.  While an unlawful or precarious 
immigration status does not preclude one from becoming a habitual resident under the Hague 
Convention, it prevents one from doing so rapidly.
68
  Specifically, a lack of lawful immigration 
status presents a problem for a parent advocating that the United States is his or her child’s 
country of habitual residence when the court is focused on the parents’ perspective or “settled 
purpose” as the most important factor in determining country of habitual residence. 69 
For example, in Alonzo v. Claudino, two undocumented Honduran citizens disputed their 
eight-year-old daughter’s habitual residence in a Hague Convention case.70  Mother, father, and 
daughter resided in the United States, but no one in the family had lawful immigration status.
71
 
The mother argued that her daughter’s habitual residence was the United States because the 
daughter had lived there for two years and because both the mother and father made the decision 
                                                        
65
 Koch, 450 F.3d at 709. 
66
 Id. at 717. 
67
 Id. at 717–718. 
68
 Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1082 n.45 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing E.M. Clive, The Concept of Habitual 
Residence, 1997 JURID. REV. 137, 147 (1997)). 
69
 Id. (“[Immigration status is also a highly relevant circumstance when, as here, the shared intent of the parents is in 
dispute.”). 
70
 Alonzo v. Claudino, No. 1:06CV00800, 2007 WL 475340 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 7, 2007). 
71
 Id. at *1. 
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to come to the United States.
72
  Ultimately, the court—following a parent-centric approach—
held that the “degree of settled purpose” necessary to establish habitual residency in the United 
States for the purpose of the Convention does not exist when the child and parent advocating for 
the United States as the habitual residence country are not lawfully present in the United States
73
  
Alonzo and other cases holding that a lack of lawful immigration status is an obstacle to 
acquiring habitual residence in a country are particularly problematic, because they entirely 
disregard the perspective of the child.
74
  Consider, for example, the common case of a 
Guatemalan child who has lived since age two with her undocumented immigrant parents in the 
United States and considers herself American in every way but on paper.  If a court follows the 
Alonzo rule strictly, the determination of this child’s habitual residence will have no nexus with 
reality; the court will be forced to hold that she habitually resides in Guatemala, despite her 
complete lack of connection with the country.  Instead of the current approach, U.S. courts 
should give much less weight to a parent and child’s immigration status and instead focus on 
where the individual child believes his or her home to be.  
III. International Approaches to Determining Country of Habitual Residence 
U.S. courts rarely cite international case law
75
 when deciding which standard to use in 
country of habitual residence determinations.
76
  Nonetheless, because one of the Hague 
                                                        
72
 Id. at *5. 
73
 Id. at *6 (“It is impossible to be settled when you are subject to arrest and deportation at any time[.] . . . 
[Moreover,] Ms. Pineda has taken no steps to acquire legal status in the United States.”). 
74
 Id.; see also Carrasco v. Carrillo-Castro, 862 F.Supp.2d 1262, 1274 (D.N.M. 2012) (holding that father’s lack of 
immigration status in the United States weighed against finding the United States to be his child’s country of 
habitual residence); Miltiadous v. Tetervak, 686 F.Supp. 2d 544, 551 n.9 (E.D.Pa. 2010) (holding that a mother’s 
uncertain immigration status in the United States weighed against a finding that the United States was her children’s 
country of habitual residence).  
75
 Justice Scalia is arguably the Supreme Court Justice who most frequently criticizes U.S. courts’ use of 
international law.  See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“But the Prize for the 
Court's Most Feeble Effort to fabricate ‘national consensus’ must go to [the majority’s] appeal . . . to the views of . . 
. members of the so-called ‘world community’ . . . .  Equally irrelevant are the practices of the ‘world community,’ 
whose notions of justice are (thankfully) not always those of our people.”); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 
868 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that an international organization’s account of what it considers to be 
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Convention’s goals is uniform interpretation and application of its text, and because the Supreme 
Court and the Vienna Convention advocate consideration of the “decisions of the United States’ 
sister signatories” in order to achieve this goal, this Comment looks at foreign decisions.77  
A. Common Law Approaches 
Common law countries, as a general rule, tend to align with Mozes and its progeny.
78
  For 
example, one of the most frequently cited common law cases is Re Bates, an English decision 
which articulated and adopted the principle of “settled purpose.”79  In that case, the court stated 
that all that is required for a residence to be habitual is that the parent’s purpose of living where 
he or she does must have, “a sufficient degree of continuity to enable it properly to be described 
as settled.”80  Specifically, the court said that a parent may possess this settled purpose even if he 
or she only intends to live in the country in question for a limited period.
81
  Based on this rule, 
the court held that where an apartment was originally intended by both parents to be a temporary 
base, it acquired a more settled purpose because of the parents’ actions, including making 
arrangements for the child’s care, accommodations, and speech therapy.82  Therefore, the court 
found the country in which this apartment was located to be the habitual residence.
83
  The flaw in 
using this case as an absolute model, however, is that it did not address whether the “overtly 
stated intentions” of an older child should be taken into account when determining habitual 
residence.  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
“civilized standards of decency in other countries . . . is totally inappropriate as a means of establishing the 
fundamental beliefs of this nation.”).  
76
 Tai Vivatvaraphol, supra note 51, at 3354.  
77
 Id. See also Abott v. Abbott 560 U.S. 1, 16 (2010) (citing 42 U.S.C. (b)(3)(B) §11601 (2008)) (holding that 
considering the views of sister signatories is important in interpreting treaties generally and emphasizing that this 
“principle applies with special force in [Hague Convention cases]” because “Congress has directed that ‘uniform 
international interpretation of the Convention’ is part of the Convention’s framework.”).  
78
 Id.  
79
 Re Bates, (1989) CA 122/89 (High Ct. of Justice, Fam. Div., Royal Cts. of Justice) 1989 WL 1683783. 
80
 Id.  
81
 Id. 
82
 Id.  
83
 Id. 
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A second key common law case, Cooper v. Casey, adopted an approach similar to that of 
Bates.
84
  The court elaborated further on the Bates rule for determining country of habitual 
residence and set forth two principles: first, a young child’s habitual residence is the same as that 
of his or her parents and neither parent can unilaterally change it without the other parent’s 
consent.
85
  Second, the habitual residence of a married couple is the country that the couple has 
voluntarily adopted for settled purposes as part of their regular lives.
86
  Again, this case is 
problematic because it did not address how the approach would vary if it were applied to 
determining the habitual residence of an older or mature child. 
B. Civil Law Approaches 
Civil law countries have frequently adopted more objective approaches to determining 
habitual residence under the Hague Convention.
87
  Compared to common law countries, these 
nations’ approaches line up more squarely with Friedrich and its progeny.88  For example, in 
Wilner, Eduardo Mario v. Osswald, María Gabriela, Argentina’s Supreme Court of Justice faced 
a case in which a mother removed her three-year-old child, who had lived her entire life in 
Canada, from the country and brought her to Argentina.
89
  The court adopted a child-centric 
approach
90
 to determining country of habitual residence and emphasized that any interpretation 
that makes a child’s habitual residence dependent on the parents’ domicile is mistaken.91  The 
                                                        
84
 18 Fam LR 433 (Austl.).  
85
 Id. 
86
 Id.  
87
 Tai Vivatvaraphol, supra note 51. 
88
 Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1396 (6th Cir. 1993). 
89
 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 14/6/1995, “Wilner, 
Eduardo Mario v. Osswald, María Gabriela / recurso de hecho,” Colección Oficial de Fallos de la Corte Suprema de 
Justicia de la Nación [Fallos] (1995-318-1269) (Arg.), translated and available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070526143121/http:// www.hcch.net/incadat/fullcase/0362.htm. 
90
 Id. (“The term habitual residence as used in the Convention refers to a factual situation that implies stability and 
permanence and alludes to the center of the minor’s life, excluding any reference to minors’ depending domicile.”). 
91
 Id.  
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court then held that since the child had developed her life in Canada, the locale of her family and 
school, her habitual residence was Canada.
92
 
 A Swedish court faced with a similar case also put the emphasis in determining country 
of habitual residence on the child’s perspective.93  In Johnson v. Johnson, the court held that 
“habitual residence is where there is constancy with regard to the duration of the period 
concerned, among other factors.”94  The court then added that such an inquiry should take into 
account all relevant objective circumstances that can show a child’s permanent attachment to one 
country over another, including the child’s existing social ties.95  
 In sum, the approaches of both U.S. and international courts leave much to be desired in 
terms of their methods for determining country of habitual residence—specifically, the explicit 
opinion of the child.  While the Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits come the closest to considering 
children’s opinions by focusing on the child’s perspective, even these fail to take the children’s 
opinions directly into account when determining country of habitual residence.  The next section 
discusses the U.S. trend against appointing lawyers for children in Hague Convention 
proceedings, which further limits American children’s ability to influence country of habitual 
residence determinations.  The remainder of the Comment presents arguments in support of (1) 
including the child’s opinion as a heavily-weighted factor in country of habitual residence 
determinations and (2) requiring all U.S. courts to appoint attorneys to represent children in 
Hague Convention cases.  
 
 
                                                        
92
 Id.  
93
 Vivatvaraphol, supra note 51, at 3359.  
94
 Id.  
95
 Id.  
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IV.  U.S. Trend Against Appointing Counsel For Children In Hague Convention Cases 
Although U.S. courts have the authority to appoint guardians ad litem, counsel, or both 
for children in Hague Convention cases,
96
 in practice, separate representation is “far less 
common than warranted.”97  There are several reasons for the rarity of appointed counsel in these 
types of cases.  First, in many traditional custody cases, third parties, such as mediators, social 
workers, or grandparents have a stake in the legal proceedings, and these individuals are able to 
either advocate for the child’s rights or ask the court to appoint an attorney for the child.98  In 
Hague Convention cases, however, it is less common for such interested persons to be involved 
in proceedings,
99
 and therefore, it is less common for someone to speak up and request that the 
judge appoint counsel for the child.
100
  Additionally, since a relatively small number of Hague 
Convention cases are brought each year
101
 and many judges are unfamiliar with the intricacies of 
these cases,
102
 some judges may assume Hague Convention cases deal with purely jurisdictional 
issues.
103
  Consequently, fact finders may believe that a dedicated representative for the child is 
                                                        
96
 Weiner, supra note 5, at 377 n.214.  Some courts adjudicating Hague petitions appoint a guardian ad litem: 
Danaipour v. McLarey, 286 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2002); Lieberman v. Tabachnik, No. 07-CV-02415-WYD, 2007 WL 
4548570 (D. Colo. Dec. 19, 2007); McManus v. McManus, 354 F. Supp. 2d 62, 69 (D. Mass. 2005); Olguin v. 
Santana, No. 03 CV 6299(JG), 2004 WL 1752444 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2004).  Some courts appoint an attorney who 
acts in the dual role of both the guardian ad litem and the child attorney: Kufner v. Kufner, 519 F.3d 33, 37 (1st Cir. 
2008); Wasniewski v. Grzelak-Johannsen, No. 5:06-CV-2548, 2007 WL 1461794, at *1 (N.D. Ohio May 16, 2007).  
In divorce and custody proceedings, courts sometimes appoint two individuals, both a guardian ad litem and an 
attorney for the children: Schult v. Schult, 699 A.2d 134, 135 (Conn. 1997); Schain v. Schain, No. FA000156786S, 
2002 WL 450387, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2002). 
97
 Sthoeger, supra note 15, at 529.  
98
 See generally ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY, AND STATE: PROBLEMS AND 
MATERIALS ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW (Aspen Publishers, eds. 6th ed. 2009).  
99
 Weiner, supra note 5, at 378 n.220 (explaining that courts use mediation infrequently in Hague Convention cases). 
One reason that social workers are less frequently involved in Hague Convention cases than in other family custody 
matters may be that no evaluation of the best interests of the child is required in Hague Convention cases.  
100
 Id. at 377.  
101
 See New Outgoing Cases, supra, note 3. 
102
 Weiner, supra note 5, at 392 (“No matter whether the case is heard in state or federal court the judge is unlikely 
to have adjudicated a Hague Convention case before.”). 
103
 To categorize the Hague Convention as a treaty governing primarily jurisdiction would be inaccurate.  The Hague 
Convention allows a country of removal to assess whether an individual residing within its jurisdiction committed a 
wrongful substantive act by removing a child from another country.  When a removal is determined to be wrongful, 
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not necessary.  The average young age of many children involved in Hague Convention cases
104
 
may also lead judges to believe that the appointment of counsel would not be helpful in such 
cases.  Finally, in some cases, judges reject requests for the appointment of counsel for a child.
105
   
V. Why U.S. Courts Should Create A Child-Centric System For Determining Country Of 
Habitual Residence 
As shown above, even the most child-centric courts in the United States and abroad often 
fail to consider a child’s personal perspective or opinion about his or her country of habitual 
residence in making habitual residence determinations under the Hague Convention.
106
  This is 
far from the trend in other areas of law that affect children; many domestic and international laws 
require the consideration of a child’s opinion in proceedings that affect his or her life.  Moreover, 
common-sense arguments support the need to include children’s opinions in making these 
determinations.  Finally, and perhaps most significantly, children’s opinions are already 
considered in Hague Convention cases in the limited context of the Convention’s objection-to-
return exception.
107
  Below, this Comment discusses these areas of the law and explains why 
courts should follow the trends they create in order to revolutionize the process for determining 
habitual residence under the Hague Convention.   
                                                                                                                                                                                  
the result is not the transfer of the case to the home country’s court, but a requirement that the country of removal 
secure the prompt return of the child.   
104
 See Janet Chiancone et al., Issues in Resolving Cases of International Child Abduction by Parents, JUV. JUST. 
BULL. (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 2011 at 4 (A survey by the 
ABA Center on Children and the Law found that of 97 U.S. parents “whose children had been taken to or retained in 
another country by the other parent” found that the average age of abducted children was five years.)  See also Swiss 
Federal Office of Justice, International Child Abduction and Contact Conflicts at 20, available at 
http://www.ejpd.admin.ch/content/dam/data/gesellschaft/kindesentfuehrung/bro-kindsentfuehrung-e.pdf (“The 
average age of the children involved [in Swiss international child abduction cases] is approximately seven years.”).  
105
 See, e.g., Clarke v. Clarke, No. 08-690, 2008 WL 2217608, at *4 n.3 (E.D. Pa. May 27, 2008) (finding no 
authority in state law for an appointment in a Hague case); Hasan v. Hasan, No. 03-11960-GAO, 2004 WL 57073, at 
*4 (D. Mass. Jan. 13, 2004) (claiming an appointment would lead the court to litigate the children's best interests, 
something prohibited by the Convention). 
106
 See, e.g., Karkkainen v. Kovalchuk, 445 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2006); Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 224 (3d 
Cir. 1995); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396 (6th Cir. 1993).  
107
 Convention, supra note 6, at art. 13 
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A. International Laws Guaranteeing a Child’s Right to be Heard 
Although the section of the Hague Convention dealing with country of habitual residence 
determinations does not give national courts adjudicating cases much guidance as to whether or 
not a child’s views should be considered, other sections of the Hague Convention explicitly 
require consideration of the child’s opinion.108  One such area is Article Thirteen, which sets out 
the situations in which a state is not required to carry out the return of a child to his country of 
habitual residence.
109
  
Article Thirteen creates one particularly relevant exception which states that a court “may 
refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has 
attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take into account its 
views.”110  The biggest interpretative challenge with this exception is related to determining at 
what age a child acquires sufficient maturity to take advantage of it.
111
  The Hague Convention 
itself contains no “threshold age” for hearing a child’s objections, but some U.S. courts have 
created such a threshold.
112
  For example, one court held that the children’s objection clause 
“simply does not apply to a nine-year-old,”113 seemingly establishing that as a matter of law a 
nine-year-old may not raise an objection under Article Thirteen, Section Two.
114
  Another U.S. 
court held that courts are not precluded as a matter of law from considering the views of an 
eight-year-old under Article Thirteen.
115
 
                                                        
108
 Id.  
109
 Id.  
110
 Id.  
111
 Anastacia M. Greene, Seen and Not Heard? Children’s Objections Under the Hague Convention On 
International Child Abduction, 13 U. MIAMI INT’L COMP. L. REV. 105, 128 (2005). 
112
 Id.  
113
 Id. (citing Tahan v. Duquette, 613 A.2d 486, 490 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1992)). 
114
 Id. at 129. 
115
 Id. (citing Raijmakers-Eghaghe v. Haro, 131 F. Supp. 2d 953 (E.D. Mich. 2001)). 
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In contrast, some U.S. courts focus more on the individual child’s maturity when 
determining whether a child is old enough to take advantage of the “objection to return” 
exception.  In In re Interest of Zarate, an Illinois court focused on the eight-year-old objecting 
child’s individual comprehension level and discounted her objection because during an 
interview, she could not identify the year she was born, list all of her school classes, or 
distinguish between her natural father and her stepfather.”116  Other U.S. courts rely on the 
decisions of counselors and psychologists to determine whether the child is sufficiently mature to 
have his views considered.
117
  As a general rule, U.S. courts generally favor a “narrow” 
construction of what constitutes age and maturity and are reluctant to consider children’s 
objections.
118
  
English and South African courts have taken a different approach. For example, in Re S, 
the English Court of Appeals held: 
When Art. 13 speaks of an age and maturity level at which it is appropriate to take 
account of a child’s views, the enquiry which it envisages is not restricted to a 
generalized appraisal of the child’s capacity to form unexpressed views which 
bear the hallmark of maturity.  It is permissible (and indeed will often be 
necessary) for the court to make specific enquiry as to whether the child has 
reached a stage of development at which, when asked the question, ‘Do you 
object to a return to your home country?’ he or she can be relied on to give an 
answer which does not depend upon instinct alone, but is influenced by the 
discernment which a mature child brings to the questions, [for example, 
considering the] implications for his or her own best interests in the long and short 
term.”119  
 
                                                        
116
 In re Interest of Zarate, 1996 WL 734613 at *4 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
117
 Greene, supra note 111, at 131–32.  Testimony of psychologists is not dispositive, however, and often, judges 
simply base the decision on their own examination and observations of the child.  
118
 See England v. England, 234 F.3d 268 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Children who are wrongfully removed or retained within 
the meaning of the Convention are to be promptly returned unless one of the narrow exceptions set forth in the 
Convention applies.”). 
119
 Re S (Minors) (Abduction: Acquiescence) 1 FLR 819 (Court of Appeal, 1994) (emphasis added). 
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This more relaxed standard allows English courts the flexibility to accept the objections of young 
children in cases where such consideration is warranted.
120
  South Africa also considers the 
objections of young children,
121
 both by using both a flexible standard and by requiring 
dedicated representation for all children in Hague Convention proceedings.
122
  This combination 
has allowed South African courts to consider the objections of children as young as five and 
eight years old.
123
  
The English and South African approaches provide the best option for determining 
whether a child’s opinion should be taken into account, because they allow all children who are 
able to form a reasoned opinion about their best interests to have a voice in the proceedings that 
profoundly affect their lives.  This broad approach to determining whether a child is mature 
enough to be heard should be applied to considering a child’s opinion on his or her country of 
habitual residence.  
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (“U.N. Convention”), ratified 
by every nation in the world except the United States, Somalia, and South Sudan,
124
 is another 
international instrument that codifies children’s right to be heard.125  The treaty expresses the 
principle that children are entitled to freedom of expression and assures that children have a 
voice in legal proceedings and custody decisions that directly affect their interests.
126
  The 
United States’ failure to ratify the U.N. Convention means that the treaty is not binding law in 
                                                        
120
 Greene, supra note 111, at 158.  
121
 Trynie Boezaart, Colloquium: Listening to Children’s Voice: Listening to the Child’s Objection, 2013 NZ L. 
REV. 357, 369 (2013) (“Neither the CRC nor the Abduction Convention sets a minimum age for children to be 
afforded an opportunity to air their views.”).  
122
 Id. 
123
 Id. (citing KG v. CB [2012] 4 SA 136 (Supreme Court of Appeal) and Central Authority v. MR (Ls Intervening) 
[2011] 2 SA 428 (GNP HC)).  
124
 UNICEIF, THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S CHILDREN 2012 16 (2012), available at 
http://www.unicef.org/sowc2012/pdfs/SOWC%202012-Main%20Report_EN_13Mar2012.pdf 
125
 Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., 61st Plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (1989) 
[Hereinafter U.N. Convention]. 
126
 Id.  
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the United States, but the U.S. Secretary of State did sign the original treaty.
127
  This signature, 
along with the U.N. Convention’s widespread acceptance and support, make the principles it 
articulates persuasive in American courts.
128
  
The most relevant provision of the U.N. Convention is Article Twelve.
129
  This Section 
provides that, “a child who is capable of forming his or her views has the right to express those 
views freely in all matters affecting the child.”130  This provision should be considered by U.S. 
courts in their formulation of standards for determining country of habitual residence in Hague 
Convention cases.  If U.S. courts were to take this provision into account, they would be forced 
to acknowledge that the current dominant interpretations of habitual residence—which consider 
only evidence of a child’s acclimatization and settled parental intent—are in direct violation of 
Article Twelve.  In order to comply with this important piece of international law, U.S. courts 
should create opportunities for children to speak their minds and have their thoughts considered 
in Hague Convention cases.  
B. U.S. Laws Guaranteeing a Child’s Right to be Heard 
Traditionally, under U.S. law, children had very little voice in the resolution of disputes 
regarding their own residence, care, and access to each parent.
131
  Today, however, U.S. courts 
are more open to considering children’s wishes in traditional custody disputes.132  A child’s 
wishes are often considered as a part of a “best interests of the child”-style determination.  
                                                        
127
 LUISA BLANCHFIELD, CONG. RES. CTR., THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: 
BACKGROUND AND POLICY ISSUES 1 (Cong. Res. Ctr., ed., 2009) (“On February 16, 1995, then-Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright signed the Convention on behalf of the United States.”). 
128
 Rebeca Rios-Kohn, The Convention on the Rights of the Child, Progress and Challenge, 5 GEO J. ON FIGHTING 
POVERTY 156–57 (1998).  
129
 U.N. Convention, supra note 125, at art. 12. 
130
 Id. 
131
 D. MARIANNE BLAIR ET AL, FAMILY LAW IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 422 (2009). 
132
 Id.  
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Section 402 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (“UMDA”) attempts to codify 
existing law dealing with child custody in disparate U.S. jurisdictions.
133
  For this reason, it 
serves as a good representation of how U.S. state courts consider a child’s opinion in child 
custody determinations.  UMDA Section 402 states: “The court shall determine custody in 
accordance with the best interests of the child.  The court shall consider all relevant factors 
including: . . . (2) The wishes of the child as to his custodian[.] . . .”134  The fact that a child’s 
wishes are such a prominent factor in determining custody in domestic disputes serves as a 
strong argument for why courts should consider this same opinion in Hague Convention cases.  
Additionally, individual U.S. courts assign a great deal of weight to children’s wishes in 
making custody determinations. This trend is illustrated by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania 
case, Johns v. Cioci.
135
  In Johns, the court held that when an adjudicator is trying to determine 
which of two equally suitable households a child should live in, the preference of the child can 
“tip the scales in favor of one or the other.”136  Moreover, the court stated, “even if [two] 
households are not equivalently suitable for rearing [a child], the child’s preference is a factor 
that must be carefully considered in custody decisions, keeping in mind the child's maturity and 
intelligence, as well as the reasons that the child offers for the preference.”137 
C. Common Sense Arguments in Favor of Including a Child’s Opinion in Country of 
Habitual Residence Determinations 
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of weighing children’s opinions as the most 
important factor in country of habitual residence determinations in Hague Convention cases is 
simple common sense.  If judges give children the opportunity to set forth their opinions about 
                                                        
133
 Unif. Marriage & Divorce Act § 402 [Best Interests of the Child], Comment.  
134
 Unif. Marriage & Divorce Act § 402 [Best Interests of the Child]. 
135
 Johns v. Cioci, 865 A.2d 931 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004). 
136
 Id.  
137
 Id.  
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what country they consider to be home, the process may reveal relevant information that 
otherwise never would have been exposed.
138
  Moreover, hearing a child’s explanation of why he 
or she considers one country to be “home” can often provide a stronger picture of the child’s 
“level of acclimatization” than other objective factors.139  Finally, allowing a child to express 
him or herself is the easiest way for a judge to determine whether the child’s interests conflict 
with those of his or her parents.  
Those critical of weighing children’s opinions heavily in country of habitual residence 
determinations may argue that children can be unduly influenced by the parent they live with or 
that children who are victims abuse may be coerced by their abusive parent into lying in court.  
This is a valid concern. These problems can be remedied, however, by requiring courts to 
appoint a dedicated attorney for the child in all Hague Convention cases.
140
  This, and further 
arguments in support of requiring court appointed counsel to represent children in all Hague 
Convention cases are handled more thoroughly in Part VI below.  
D. Proposed Standard for Determining Country of Habitual Residence 
With the above arguments in mind, important changes should be made to the way U.S. 
courts deal with Hague Convention cases.  Specifically, courts should adopt a uniform standard 
for determining country of habitual residence.  In figure one, below, this Comment proposes a 
starting point for such a standard: 
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 Linda D. Elrod, Please Let Me Stay: Hearing the Voice of the Child in Hague Abduction Cases, 63 OKLA. L. 
REV. 663, 686 (2011) (“The judge can learn much from discovering the child's self-perception of his or her interests 
and the reasons given for any objection.”). 
139
 Id.  
140
 Because such an attorney will meet with the child independently and advocate for his or her best interests, this 
advocate will be uniquely situated to discover undue influence or coercion by one or both parents.  
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Figure 1. Model Standard 
a. When determining country of habitual residence for the purpose of the Hague 
Convention On The Civil Aspects Of International Child Abduction, courts 
should balance three key factors: (1) the child’s level of adjustment and 
acclimatization to each place that is claimed to be his country of habitual 
residence; (2) the settled intent of the individuals with the right to fix the 
child’s residence; and (3) the child’s perspective and personal opinion as to 
which country is his home. 
b. Factor (3) should only be considered if the child is old enough to articulate 
such an opinion. This factor should be given additional weight if the child is 
of a “significant age and maturity level”.141  
c. Factor (3) should be discounted if one parent or a third party has unduly 
influenced the child.  The parent alleging undue influence bears the burden of 
proving this allegation. 
This standard is ideal for two reasons.  First, it will require courts to put more emphasis on 
children’s opinions about where they consider home, bringing the United States into compliance 
with respected international law such as the U.N. Convention. This consequence will result in 
more accurate country of habitual residence determinations.  Second, a uniform standard will 
provide parents with improved capacity to predict whether a planned removal or retention of 
their child is wrongful and therefore result in increased compliance with the Hague 
Convention.
142
  
                                                        
141
 For the purposes of Figure 1, “significant age and maturity level” should be defined as in the English decision Re 
S (Minors) (Abduction: Acquiescence) 1 FLR 819 (Court of Appeal, 1994). 
142
 See Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1072–73 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Habitual residence is the central—often outcome 
determinative—concept on which the entire system is founded.  Without intelligibility and consistency in its 
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VI.  Courts Should Appoint Counsel to Represent Children in Hague Convention Cases 
In contrast with the United States, other Hague Convention signatory countries require 
appointed counsel in international child abduction cases.  The United States should follow the 
lead of these nations, as doing so would lead to fairer, more child-friendly determinations of 
country of habitual residence. 
A. The Swiss Model 
After much frustration over the domestic application of the Hague Convention, in 2007, 
the Swiss Parliament enacted a law that ensures representation for children in all Hague 
Convention cases.
143
  Article Nine of this law states: “The court shall order that the child be 
represented and designate as a representative a person experienced in welfare and legal matters.  
This person may file applications and lodge appeals.”144  Part of the motivation for this article 
was that the Parliament had found that judges rarely exercised their authority to appoint 
representatives for children in divorce and Hague Convention cases.
145
  This rule is admirable in 
particular because, by eliminating parents’ and courts’ discretion on the issue of appointing 
counsel, the rule has reduced inequities in the protection of children’s interests.146  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
application, parents are deprived of crucial information they need to make decisions and children are more likely to 
suffer the harms the Convention seeks to prevent.  Imagine for, for example, a parent trying to decide whether to 
travel with a child to attempt reconciliation with an estranged spouse in another country or whether to consent to a 
child’s trip abroad to stay with in-laws.  Such parents would be vitally interested in knowing under what 
circumstances a child’s habitual residence is likely to be altered.”). 
143
 Swiss Federal Act Art. 9(3), Dec. 21, 2007, feuille fédérale suisse [FF] 37 (2008), available at 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/ff/2008/33.pdf (translated in Andreas Bucher, The New Swiss Federal Act on 
International Child Abduction, 4 J. PRIV. INT'L L. 139, 163 (2008)). 
144
 Id. 
145
 Weiner, supra note 5, at 377 (quoting Andreas Bucher, The New Swiss Federal Act on International Child 
Abduction, 4 J. PRIV. INT'L L. 139, 150) (noting that Article 9(3) is innovative because it makes it “compulsory for 
the judge to designate a representative who acts as custodian for the child.”).  
146
 Weiner, supra note 5, at 376.  
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B. The South African Example 
 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa focuses on children’s best interests as 
the most important consideration in all matters concerning the nation’s children.147  Moreover, 
South Africa has legislation in place requiring that, “a child that is of such an age, maturity and 
stage of development as to be able to participate has the right to express his or views and the 
right that those views must be given due consideration” in all matters that affect him or her.148  
The nation further ensures children’s rights to have a voice in Hague Convention proceedings by 
requiring that a child “must have legal representation in all Abduction Convention 
applications.”149  In practice, the legal representative functions in a fashion similar to a guardian 
ad litem in the cases of young children, while with older children the lawyer can take instructions 
directly from the child and act accordingly.
150
  This system has been particularly positive 
because with the addition of advocates for children, South African courts have been able to take 
the opinions of young children into account in Hague Convention cases.
151
  This success serves 
as a strong argument that requiring counsel for children in all Hague Convention cases in the 
United States would both be feasible and allow children’s voices to be heard.  
C. Argument for Requiring Counsel for Children in All Hague Convention Cases 
U.S. courts should follow Switzerland’s and South Africa’s lead and require counsel for children 
in all Hague Convention cases.
152
  The decision a court makes in a Hague Convention case 
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 See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA Feb. 4, 1997, Ch. 2, s 28. (“A child’s best interests are of 
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regarding whether a child was wrongfully removed from his country of habitual residence is 
extremely important in determining whether the child must be returned to another nation.  
Consequently, these determinations indelibly impact the lives of hundreds of children 
annually.
153
  Moreover, there is a growing consensus in the U.S. legal community that children 
should always have an independent client-directed lawyer in proceedings that affect them.
154
  
Finally, requiring counsel in all Hague Convention proceedings would allow the model standard 
proposed in Figure 1
155
 to be implemented in the most successful fashion possible.  
VII. Conclusion 
 
When determining country of habitual residence in Hague Convention cases, U.S. courts 
should move away from their current jurisprudence and adopt a child-centric approach that 
incorporates the opinion of the child, such as the test set forth in Figure 1.
156
  Moreover, in order 
to properly implement this new test, the United States should require the appointment of 
independent counsel for the child in every Hague Convention case.  Together, these two changes 
would bring U.S. law into line with international law, increase predictability in Hague 
Convention cases, and create fairer outcomes for children caught in the middle of complicated 
custody battles.  
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